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caprice to defeat that purpose by merely failing to make the
payments or by the action of the commission in setting aside
the referee's affirmance of the initial allowance. Certainly
the Legislature did not intend that the main, and as expressed
in the Abelleira case, the most important part of the act
should rest upon such a precarious basis. Second, the benefits must be paid "regardless of any appeal." That phrase
clearly embraces the decision on appeal. Paraphrasing, it
would read that the benefits are payable regardless of a revorsal on appeal. In other words there was an absolute
obligation to pay, and the Legislature chose to assume the
risk of error by the referee. (AbeUeira v. District Court of
Appeal, supra.) Third, the above discussed rule of statutory construction applies, namely, that the only limitation
attached to the payment was in respect to the employer's
account. The expression of that condition eliminates others
and others may not bc added by judicial construction.
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it follows
that the employees here involved were entitled to unemployment insurance benefits from the date of the affirmance of
the award in their favor by the referee and that such benefits should be paid until the final determination by this court
that they were not entitled thereto.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN STEAMSHIP COMP ANY (a
Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents;
JAMES DUGGAR et al., Interveners and Respondents.
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[1] Unemployment Relief -

If

[1] See 11 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "UnemployMcK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Relief.
ment Reserves and Social Security."
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against employers operating terminal facilities for transporting freight by water and who refused to work for them during
the strike left their work because of a trade dispute within
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a) (Stats. 1935, ch. 352:
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), and were precluded by that
section from receiving benefit payments for unemployment
during the strike, although at the beginning of the strike they
were either not working on any assignment or were working
for employers not subject to the strike.

I

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California Employment Commission to vacate an order awarding benefit
payments and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts
,with such payments. Writ granted.
Brobeck, Phlcger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison f01"
Petitioners.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Maurice P. McCaffrey, Glenn V. Walls, Ralph R. Plante en, Charles
P. Scully, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis &
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Gladstein for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 10, 1939, the Ship Clerks'
Union, Local 1-34 of the International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union, called a strike effective at 6 :00 p. m.
on that day against employers who were members of the Dockcheckers Employers' Association of San Francisco, because
they could not agree upon the renewal terms of collective bargaining agreements that had expired on September 30, 1939.
The strike continued until January 3, 1940, when it was terminated by agreement of the parties. The Dock-Checkers' Employers' Association, now part of the Waterfront Employers'
Association of San Francisco, represented its members, who
operate terminal facilities for freight transported by water
to and from ports on San Francisco Bay, in their collective
bargaining with the Ship Clerks' Union. The employment
arrangement, similar to that for the longshoremen, was established under a contract executed on March 30, 1937, between
the checkers' union and the employers' association. By agree-
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ment the parties were continuing to operate under this ~oii
tract at the time of the strike. The union and the employers'
association operated jointly a hiring hall from which checkers
were dispatched as employers called for them. There are
several classes of checkers: (1) monthly checkers, who work
for only one company and are paid a monthly salary; (2) preferreddaily checkers, who work for only one company so long
as their services are needed and are paid on an hourly basis
but who are allowed to work through the hiring hall as casual
daily checkers if the company by which they are preferred has
no work for them for more than a two-day period; (3) casual
daily checkers, who are members of the union and are dispatched in rotation from the hiring hall to work on an hourly
basis for various employers and who may work for a number
of employers in anyone day; (4) permit checkers; who are not
members of the checkers' union but are represented by it for
collective bargaining purposes, and are dispatched through
the hiring hall after the casual daily checkers' list is exhausted. Workers are dispatched from the hiring hall in rotation to equalize work opportunities. Upon finishing an assignment the checker returns to the hiring hall to await assignment
to a new job.
I
The present proceeding involves the CJlaims for unemploy.!
ment insurance benefits for the period of the strike of 125
casual daily checkers, preferred daily checkers whose status
had become that of casual daily checkers, and permit checkers, who went on It strike although they were either not working upon any a..~signment at 6 :00 p. m. on November 10,
1939, or were working at that time for employers who were
not members of the association and not subject to the strike.
Workers in the latter classification. continued to work until
their job assignments were completed. All of the claimants'
refused to work during the strike for any of the members of I
the employers' association against whom the strike was called.:
The claims were denied by the adjustment unit of the;
Division of Unemployment Insurance, but the referee granted.
them upon the ground that claimants did not leave theil'
work because of a trade disputc within the mcaning of section 56 (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats.
1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d.~1
The commission affirmed the award, with two members dissenting. The employers thereupon petitioned the District

Aug. 1944] AM.-HAWAIIAN S. S. Co. 'iJ. CAL. EMP. COM. 719
[24 C.2d 716]

Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, for

Ii writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its
order awarding benefit payments and to refrain from charging their accounts with such payments. That court issued
the writ and this court granted a hearing at the request of
the commission and of the claimants who intervened in the
proceeding. By stipulation the case was submitted on the
record of the proceedings before the commission with .the
reservation of the right to try the question before the court
whether the parties should have the right to try the case
de novo, but the question as to that right was not argued.
[1] Since the claimants went on a strike against petitioners and refused' to work for them during the strike, they
left their work because of a trade dispute within the meaning of section 56 (a) of the California Unemployment Insurance Act, supra, and are precluded by that section from
receiving benefit payments for unemployment during the
period of the strike. (Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Oalifornia
Employment Oommission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202].)
The contention that petitioners have not exhausted their administrative and legal remedies under section 41.1 of the act
is answered adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc., v. Oalifornia Employment Oommission, supra, and the contention that
the court is without power in this proceeding in mandamus
,to review the decision of the commission is answered adversely
in Bodinson ManUfacturing 00. v. Oalifornia Employment
Oommission, 17 Ca1.2d 321, 328-330 [109 P .2d 935].
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis,' J., and Edmonds, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached for the
reason that the unemployment occurred after the effective
, date of the 1939 amendment to section 67 of the Unemployment Insurance Act.
In' this case the initial determination by the adjustment
.unit denied unemployment benefits. Although that denial was
. reversed by the referee and benefits allowed and the latter
. order affirmed by the commission, benefits were not pay,able regardless of the appeal because section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act as it read in 1939
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(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085) required that payments be madE.'
where the referee affirmed "an initial determination allowing benefits." In 1937 it provided that if a referee affirms
a decision of a deputy or' the commission affirms a decision
of the referee allowing benefits, the benefits must be paid
regardless of the appeal. (Stats. 1937, p. 2059.) (See dis.
senting opinion in W. R. Grace (~ Co. v. California Emp.
Com., this day filed post, p. 734 [151 P.2d 223].)
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Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
[4]

Aug. 18, 1944.]

W. R. GRACE & COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Petitioners, V. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et aI., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et a1.,
Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-A writ
of mandamus is not so exceptional in nature that it is never
abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although it was
originally a high prerogative writ to which the plea of another
action pending was not available, it no longer depends on prerogative power and is by statute expressly subject to the rules
of practice applicable to other actions when there are no provisions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.)
[2] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action - Mandamus Proceedings.-A writ of mandamus is denied if a similar application between the same parties on the same matter is already
pending before another court. The pendency of another action,

[5]

[6]

[7]

[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 763, 849; 34 Am.Jur. 811; 35 Am.Jur. 70.
[2] Action or suit as abating mandamus proceeding or vice
versa, note, 37 A.L.R. 1432. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 28, 31; 1 Am.Jur.
31,40.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 75; [2] Abatement and
Revival, §§ 17,19; [3-7,9-18] Unemployment Relief; [8] Statutes,
§ 184.
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Schauer, J., concurred.

[So F. No. 16839. In Bank.
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however, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties
for the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430(3).)
Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.Superior court actions brought under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 (Stats. '1939, p. 2051; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1939 Supp., Act 8780d), do not abate a mandamus proceeding
in the Supreme Court to test the validity of the Employment
Commission's decision that claimants are entitled to benefits
of the act, where the parties are not the same, some employers
and claimants in the mandamus proceeding not being involved
in the other actions. Moreover, the two causes of action are
not the same, an action under § 45.10 simply determining the
propriety of the employer's contribution to the fund, whereas
the mandamus proceeding is in effect an appeal to the courts
from a determination under § 67.
ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Parment.-No cause of action arises under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 in relation to unemployment benefits unless
they actually affect the amount of the employer'scontrlbution
and he pays the increased amount under protest.
ld.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that plaintiffs in actions to recover unemployment contributions paid
under protest may seek to support their claims with proof
identical to that introduced in a separate mandamus proceeding to test the validity of an award of unemployment benefits,
is insufficient as il. ground of abatement of the mandamus
proceeding.
ld. - Remedies of Employer -.:.. Mandamus - Limitations.-A
mandamus proceeding to compel the Employment Commission
to vacate an award of unemployment benefits need not be
commenced within the time prescribed for bringing an action
under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 or § 41.1 to recover contributions alleged to have been illegally assessed
against an employer. The limitation periods prescribed in
those statutes are not made applicable by Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1109, which specifies for mandamus proceedings only the
limitation periods prescribed in part two of that code.
ld. - Remedies of Employer - Mandamus - Limitations and
Laches.-Where the Employment Commission's decision granting unemployment benefits was not released until more than
13 months from the time it was dated, and where a request
for a rehearing was denied about two months later, a mandamus
proceeding against the commission about 22 months after the
date of said decision was within any applicable statute of
limitations, and was not barred by laches.

